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Currently, the world is expending vast amounts of
resources, both physical and human, on its military
effort. Although in total, the bulk of this is accounted
for by the industrialised countries, over the last 20
years military expenditure has grown more rapidly in
the Third World than in NATO or the Warsaw Pact.
This has produced high military burdens (the share of
defence expenditure in national income) in many less
developed countries (Ides). The Third World is also
the major market for weapons exported by the
industrialised countries. Financing these arms pur-
chases imposes considerable cost in terms of scarce
foreign exchange and increased indebtedness.
Within the Third World the high levels of military
expenditure are linked to pressing security concerns
such as regional antagonisms, civil conflicts, and the
role of the armed forces in government. Almost all the
major conflicts since the Second World War have been
fought in the Third World and tens of millions have
died in these wars. Military expenditure raises a host of
moral, political and social issues, but in this article we
shall focus on the economic linkages. Although in
many cases the economic dimension is not the most
important aspect of the problem, it does play a central
role. In addition, after a period of relative neglect,
economists have recently become more interested in
analysing the effects of military expenditure.
The factual dimensions of defence spending are
revealing and they demonstrate that the problem is
important. In 1973, the non-oil developing countries
spent $28,518 mn on military expenditure while OPEC
spent $15,707 mn (all figures are in constant 1980
prices and 1980 exchange rate: tlus these are volume
indices. Data are taken from the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)). A
decade later, in 1982, the respective figures were
$50,810 mn and $52,903 mn. The Ides had doubled
their total defence spending within ten years, a rate of
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growth far in excess of the major Western and Eastern
Alliances.
Economic theory does not provide any clear
prediction of how a change in the military burden will
influence growth, development and welfare. Classical
theory would predict, on the basis of resource
allocation, that defence will decrease investment or
civilian consumption and thus reduce growth or
welfare. The military burden would have to be
justified on the basis of other social welfare gains such
as an increase in collective 'security'. Keynesian
theory, on the other hand, could claim that in the
presence of inadequate effective demand the operation
of the multiplier would imply an increase in national
product resulting from additional defence expenditure;
thus there could be some economic justification for
military spending. If the economy operates with
substantial excess capacity then additional demand
and output would raise capacity utilisation, thereby
increasing the rate of profit and possibly accelerating
investment. Whether in the short and long run the
former or latter effect dominates will determine the
final outcome of defence on growth.
Econometric studies of military expenditures in 14
OECD countries [Smith 1977, 1980] suggest that their
major effect is to reduce investment: there appears to
be an almost one-to-one correspondence between the
shares of military expenditure and investment in the
national product [see also Smith and Smith 1983 for a
descriptive analysis]. A similar result is reported for
the Soviet Union in Green and Higgins (1977). The
lower investment induced by higher military
expenditure will tend to feed through to lower growth
rates. Of course, the growth rate will also be influenced
by a wide variety of other factors, which may
sometimes offset the impact of military expenditure.
The theoretical case in regard to Ides is less clear-cut.
The basic arguments in terms of unproductive
resource allocation and aggregate demand stimulation
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are still to some extent applicable; but there are
'tropical' twists. It is not at all clear that the effect of a
reduction in military spending would filter through to
investment and thus growth, for it is highly possible
that conspicuous consumption will instead be
boosted. Further, in ldcs there are various potential
spin-offs (modernisation, work ethos, technical
training, discipline etc) emanating from defence
spending, that may be helpful in boosting output. If
the industrial sector in the developing country suffers
from long-term excess capacity due to structural
problems (a situation quite common in the newly
industrialising nations) a larger defence effort,
through additional procurement, might add to output
and accelerate growth.
Let us now review in more detail how defence
spending may influence the process of development in
the Third World. The emphasis is on growth (as well as
on some of the major factors that influence it) and the
military burden. This is because growth is susceptible
to quantification and our major purpose here is to
report on empirical research results. However, we also
believe that the wider issues of socioeconomic
development are crucial for ldcs even though they are
not always suitable for econometric analysis, nor
always related to growth.
(a) Capita' Formation
To appreciate the role and effect of military
expenditure in ldcs it is necessary to understand the
nature of the growth process. Growth of national
product can be achieved through accumulation of
physical and human capital. Thus saving and
investment, as well as the mobilisation of human
resources, are important and the role of defence in
affecting these variables must be noted. There may
also be a link between the two, since quite often the
productivity of investment is low in developing
countries due to absorptive capacity constraints.
Military expenditure may affect capital formation
both from the supply and demand side. In the absence
of well developed financial markets and the
managerial firm, the main supply of new capital comes
from household saving and the budgetary surplus of
the government (as well as from foreign saving, which
is discussed later). Defence expenditure, by providing
internal and external security, may change the rate of
time preference in favour of saving. Military
governments, particularly in times of war, by
exhorting the nation to patriotism, may encourage
'forced saving'. However, if threat perceptions rise
and instability increases as a consequence of this
additional military spending, then saving will fall or be
diverted to unproductive forms such as the hoarding
of gold.
50
Military spending may also affect household saving
indirectly through the government's reallocation of
state budgets. If it reduces the supply of social wage
goods, i.e. publicly provided/funded goods, such as
education, transport and health services, then private
consumption will have to rise to compensate. This in
turn may reduce the saving to income ratio. Overall
there are strong grounds for believing that defence can
reduce the supply of saving and hence adversely affect
capital formation.
On the demand side, there is the allocation effect
whereby an increase in military spending (or for that
matter any other item of government consumption)
may reduce investment. However this effect will rarely
be one-to-one in ldcs, since other elements of
aggregate demand such as civilian government
expenditure or the current account surplus might fall.
A more subtle effect on investment will be through
absorptive capacity constraints. If cooperating
factors, such as technical personnel, infrastructure,
vital intermediate imports, craft skills and so forth, are
diverted to the military as a consequence of defence
spending, then the productivity of investment will
drop, causing a reduction in the demand for new
productive capital formation. The tightening of such
constraints can produce an absorptive capacity drag
which can result in lower investment than would
otherwise have taken place. On the other hand,
counter-arguments would claim that defence has a
high productivity enhancement effect, since it
contributes to skill formation, technical and vocational
training, and the creation of new infrastructural
capital.
Human Capital
Absorptive capacity constraints can be removed or
alienated through training and skill-formation, both
ingredients of human capital. The military can have
both positive and negative effects here; on the one
hand it adds to the shock of human capital through its
own training programmes which may be useful in
civilian life. Alternatively, by possibly reducing
government spending on health and education, as well
as pulling away skilled people from more 'productive'
occupations, it lowers the aggregate productivity of
human capital. The final outcome can only be judged
empirically [Deger 1981].
Growth
A major study by Benoit [1973, 1978], seemed to
suggest that defence expenditure on balance increases
the growth rate in developing countries. There are of
course adverse allocative effects; defence is the classic
'unproductive' expenditure. But the sum total of the
beneficial channels ultimately succeed in producing a
positive association between defence and growth
leading to development. There is clearly a problem of
causality; for it is possible that high growth causes
high defence spending. However, the evidence on the
whole suggests that military budgets are determined
relatively autonomously (dependent on security
needs, threat perceptions etc.) and that causation runs
from defence to growth [see Deger 1985 for a more
complete discussionj.
Benoit's work has attracted considerable attention for
at least three reasons. His analytical reasoning is
persuasive in the sense that there is good economic
logic behind the claim that defence can indeed raise
growth; although there are also major points against
the defence burden and thus the pros and cons need to
be rehearsed carefully. Secondly, he adduces econo-
metric evidence in support of his claim; although this
also needs to be verified in a more extended empirical
model. Thirdly, the analysis shows that the
transmission mechanisms of defence efforts to the rest
of the economy may be substantially different in ldcs
from those in the developed countries. The specific
'structural' characteristics and unique features of
developing countries need to be carefully understood
before theoretical and empirical judgement can be
passed on this issue. Indeed a large part of the
Birkbeck research group's work on defence and
development has been an attempt to identify the
specific channels through which these transmission
mechanisms work.
Benoit used a single equation estimate to show that an
autonomous increase in defence burden caused a rise
in the growth rate and, contrary to expectation,
defence raised growth. However, when a more
complicated econometric system, utilising the multiple
channels that characterise the defence/growth nexus is
used the Benoit result is overturned. In various papers
[see Smith 1983, Deger and Smith 1983, Deger 1979,
Deger 1985] we have shown that taking all
interdependent effects together, when the model is
estimated by simultaneous equation methods, the
overall 'multiplier' shows that an increase in the
defence burden reduces the growth rate; and the final
value of this negative multiplier is not insignificant.
Quite often the direct effect of military spending on
growth turns out to be positive. However, almost
invariably the defence burden has a high and
significantly negative impact on saving (or investment)
and human capital, which reduces growth. The sum
total of these two influences is an aggregate negative
effect. Thus when due account is taken of the
underlying simultaneity and interdependences, there
seems to be econometric evidence that security
spending reduces growth.
(d) Import Cost and Foreign Exchange
Shortage of foreign exchange is endemic in Third
World planning and this is exacerbated by costly
weapons imports. For most Ides a large part of the
military equipment budget has to be spent on
imported armaments. According to SIPRI, weapons
imports by Ides rose from $1,559 mn in 1965 to
$10,450 mn in 1980 (all in constant 1975 prices),
though they declined to $9,551 mn in 1983 and
$7,519 mn in 1984. The latter figure may be affected by
the underrecording of recent imports, but even so, it is
almost five times larger in volume terms than the arms
transferred 20 years ago. Part of the massive rise in the
l970s was directly attributable to OPEC revenues. But
an important trend over the last decade has been the
diminished importance of military aid and the
consequent pressure on developing countries to pay in
cash or kind.
Weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange
have an obvious allocation cost in terms of reduced
resources available for the import of essential
intermediate inputs and investment goods essential for
self-sustaining growth. It is of course true that a
reduction in military imports would not necessarily
imply an equivalent increase in investments, for some
leakage in terms of conspicuous consumption or other
imports could occur. However, there can be little
doubt that lower defence imports would improve the
situation in terms of foreign exchange scarcity [Deger
and Sen 1983b].
From the point of view of national income accounting
balances, higher imports, leading to a current account
deficit, implies more net saving. Developing countries
have tended to be net borrowers in the international
capital markets. However, it is one thing to have a high
current account deficit attributable to imported
capital goods whose marginal productivity is expected
to be higher than the interest rate paid. lt is quite
another to incur trade deficits on the basis of imports
of foreign weapons systems which bring in no such
economic returns.
As is well known, the 1970s witnessed a large increase
in the aggregate indebtedness of the non-oil exporting
developing countries. The oil shock, recycling of
petro-dollars, greater commercial bank involvement,
high nominal interest rates (but low real ones), the
import demands of new industrialisation, and the
attainment of upper ceilings on domestic saving, have
all contributed to the 'debt problem'. The period
coincided, for obvious economic reasons, with the
time when defence aid was on the decline, Ides were
being wooed to receive credit-financed arms,
exporting countries were using arms exports as a
palliative for trade difficulties, and Third World
militarisation seemed to be on the increase. It is not
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easy to calculate the extent and contribution of ide
international debt attributable to the military. But
Brzoska [1983] estimates that in the latter half of the
1970s the net transfer of debt would be about 20 to
30 per cent I.ss if debt financed weapons imports had
been absent.
(e) Arms Industry
The foreign exchange burden of weapons acquisition
has been reduced to some extent by the use of counter-
trade (barter) which is becoming more prevalent in
this market, particularly for French sales. More
important is the fact that some ldcs have developed
indigenous arms industries. The initial motivation for
establishing an arms industry was often strategic, to
gain independence from foreign suppliers. The
application of President Carter's human rights policy
is said to have been a major incentive for a number of
Latin American countries to develop their own
weapons. As production expanded economic factors
increased in importance, and weapons manufacture
came to play a role in both import-substituting and
export promoting strategies of industrialisation. It is
estimated that about 34 countries in the Third World
are producing armaments of one level of sophistication
or another.
The pattern of arms production has generally been
determined by domestic industrialisation strategies.
For economies following import substituting
industrialisation arms industries have been built
principally as a way of reducing import dependence.
Countries under a regime of export promotion have
made a concerted effort to manufacture and sell
internationally relatively low cost weapons, embodying
'appropriate' technology. India and Argentine in the
first group and Brazil and Israel in the second have
generally been successful in constructing quite large
arms manufacturing bases.
Quantitatively, Third World suppliers still control a
relatively small share of the total arms market, but
that share is growing rapidly, and the 'appropriate
technology' weapons they sell have some competitive
advantages. The success of the Brazilian Embraer
design in the UK competition for a basic trainer for the
RAF is significant in this respect.
As an economic strategy the benefits of industriali-
sation through armaments are questionable. It is
expensive in terms of domestic resource costs,
especially of scarce scientific and technical skills. It
depends on extensive imports of components and
technology with consequent reliance on arms
manufacturers in the industrialised countries. Rapid
obsolescence of technology and expensive high risk
product development make the returns uncertain.
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Because of the prevalence of state subsidies for
domestic arms industries the export market is
becoming increasingly competitive. When allowance
is made for the easy credit terms, offset deals, and
co-production agreements which are characteristic of
large arms deals, the return on exports may well be less
than cost. Given the size of development costs and the
increasing returns to scale in arms production, true
independence is not possible for any country except
the superpowers. It is not surprising that India and
Israel are not only among the largest manufacturers of
weapons in the Third World, but also among the
largest importers.
(f) Government Expenditure
From Adam Smith onwards defence has been
considered the perfect example of a public good. Since
security expenditure is monopolised by the state
(including arms production in nationalised industries)
budgetary allocations are rather crucial in evaluating
its role.
Higher military spending may have multiplier effects,
particularly if it is concentrated in domestic
equipment budgets. It is also possible, with excess
industrial capacity, that there are positive inter-
industrial linkages. Thus demand generation
emanating from the military may through increased
capacity utilisation expand output, raise the rate of
return on capital, induce investment, and increase
growth. Such beneficial effects are most probably
small in the developing countries, however, whose
major problems stem from the supply sïde.
The financing of defence spending is important. If it
raises tax revenue then it is possible for government
savings to increase. But once again higher taxes are
rarely sufficient to compensate for the additional
expenditure, except in special cases of national
emergencies. Usually the extra military spending is
financed by (bond financed) borrowing, or money
creation, or reallocation from other items of spending.
Given that the market for securities is weak, the
government will go for money financed budget
deficits, which in the absence of positive supply side
effects are bound to be inflationary. Discussion on
Latin American inflation attributes this partly to the
defence burden. The impact of inflation on the
determinants of growth, however, are not clear-cut,
although Deger [1982] reports some detrimental
effects.
The third alternative may be the most pernicious.
There may be budgetary reallocations in favour of
defence and against other items of state spending. We
have already discussed the possible reductions in
health and education expenditures. But one item very
easily affected, there being little political lobbying, is
government investment in agriculture [see Chakravarty
1982]. In terms of aggregate cost-benefits and
externalities, it is often claimed that this is one of the
most productive avenues of state expenditure in Ides.
Yet agriculture seems to be one of the first casualties
when governments embark on defence expansion.
There is not very much econometric evidence for this;
but what little there is always seems to suggest that an
increase in the military burden decreases the share of
agriculture in GDP [see Faïni, Arnez and Taylor 19841.
This creates many problems: food shortages may
appear; expensive imports are necessary; industrial
raw materials become costly; demand emanating from
the agricultural sector remains depressed; and this has
adverse feedbacks on industrial production and
capacity; the wage goods constraint becomes more
stringent; shortages are exacerbated; and balanced
growth remains elusive.
(g) Spin-off
In addition to these relatively quantifiable effects,
various spin-offs have been claimed for defence
spending in Ides. One group can be conveniently
summarised under the heading of 'modernisation'.
Though the concepts are imprecise they are
nevertheless important in the process of growth. In
essence the military is expected to change people's
attitudes from those relevant to pre-industrial
societies towards more modern industrialised ones.
The work ethic would be encouraged, discipline
instilled, technological awareness heightened, and
attitudes towards nation-building fostered. Whether
the military establishments actually succeed in doing
these things and whether civilian institutions could
have done them better, are debatable points and need
to be studied in a sociological framework for specific
countries.
The other type of claimed spin-off is technological and
is also related to arms manufacture. In essence, as
technical skills improve, due both to arms use and
production, the civilian economy benefits too.
Military R & D can, in the case of dual purpose
technology, also help civilian sectors. Military
manufactures may also help non-defence sectors by
creating inter-industrial demand. However, the
opposing arguments are equally valid. Military
technology is highly specialised, secretive in nature,
'baroque' in conception, sheltered from market forces,
non-competitive in pricing and inappropriate from the
point of view of potential demand. Deger and Sen
[1983a] using time series data for India found no
significant inter-industrial multipliers; thus a much
acclaimed expansionary argument for defence seems
to be weak.
(h) Wars - the Costs
The economics of Third World wars is extremely
difficult to quantify. 'Hard' data and even simple
information is difficult to get, particularly in the mass
of propaganda that is thrown out during a war.
However, some anecdotal evidence does exist for
recent times and Kennedy [1974] has an earlier
analysis. It is thought that Israel's relatively long war
of 1973, in 22 days cost it the equivalent of a whole
year's income. The economic problems of Argentina
in terms of international debt and liquidity are well
known. For Pakistan during the period 1969-71,
which included the Civil War as well as the war with
India, GDP fell by 44 per cent. It has been claimed that
Iran's present war with Iraq has inflicted damage to
the civilian economy of the order of $100 bn, equal to
four years of state revenues including oil. Furthermore
this is over and above the pure military costs which are
themselves astronomical. Thus wars can hardly be
said to be cheap.
The previous sections have indicated the variety of
channels through which military expenditure may
influence the development process, and the difficulty
of making clear theoretical predictions of the impact
of military expenditure on other variables. The tractor
and tank trade-off is more complicted than intuition
seems to suggest. The empirical evidence is a bit more
conclusive, but further research needs to be done. The
evidence available comes from three main sources.
There are general arguments supported by anecdotal
evidence and personal experience. There are detailed
country studies placing the military in its particular
socioeconomic framework. There are econometric
studies based on aggregate data on quantifiable
variables. The latter approach has been taken by the
Birkbeck Group to analyse the relation and the effect
of military expenditure (burden) on growth, as well as
its macroeconomic determinants such as investment,
saving, foreign resources, human capital etc.
These cross-section studies over a large sample of
countries (50 in our studies) reveal some underlying
patterns for Ides taken as a whole. They seem to have
identified long term (and possibly stable) parameters.
But of course one must be careful in interpreting such
data. Fundamental structural changes will cause
distortions; and inter-country differences are hidden.
In principle cross-section analysis reveals a 'represent-
ative' view of the effects of military spending. It can be
supplemented by time-series analysis of data for
specific countries, but the lack of long series of
consistent data may restrict the application of this
technique.
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However, our econometric models do suggest that the
quantitative evidence supports the hypothesis that
defence spending in the Third World does indeed
reduce growth through its adverse effect on saving,
investment, foreign exchange, human capital and
absorptive capacity. There are undoubtedly some
positive effects and the role of various spin-offs cannot
be denied. But overall, the econometric evidence
indicates that military expenditure constitutes a
burden and that disarmament presents a major
economic opportunity.
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